

issued a strong statement welcoming it and emphatically reaffirming our traditional support for the advancement of European unity. In two previous Foreign Policy Reports, I expressed this support in similarly categorical terms — but I also pointed to the problems which European integration implied for the United States and for our political and economic relations with our allies across the Atlantic. The events of the past year have now brought these problems dramatically to the fore.

In the 1940's and into the 1950's, Western Europe was prostrate — politically, economically, and militarily. The United States, preeminent in the world, had only just emerged from its isolationist tradition. In this environment, our allies shifted the responsibility for major decisions to us. In their eyes, the overriding purpose of the new arrangements — for defense, economic policy, and foreign policy — was to link us to Europe in tangible ways on a long term peacetime basis. They therefore deferred to our prescriptions and welcomed our lead — even on formulas for European integration.

Both to us and to them the advantages of European unification were unambiguous. It would help dispel the internecine hatreds of the recent past; it would maximize the effectiveness of U. S. assistance; it would hasten Western Europe's political and economic recovery and thereby enhance its security. These were common interests, and no inconsistency was seen between European unity and broader Atlantic unity. Cooperation came so easily that it was widely assumed for years in the United States that a strong and united Europe would readily take up a large part of the American burden, while still accepting American leadership.

But a self-respecting nation or group of nations will take up a burden only if it sees it as its own burden. By the 1960's Europe was in a position to do more for itself and for the Alliance. Nevertheless, old habits on both sides of the Atlantic persisted and inhibited the development of a more balanced relationship.

— Their economies thriving, their social cohesion and institutions restored, our allies were acting more and more

self-confidently and independently on the world stage. The United States continued to lead in tutelary fashion, however, looking for allied endorsement of U. S. prescriptions.

— Our allies fluctuated between taking the U. S. commitment to Europe for granted, and panicking at the thought of U. S. withdrawal. We would not withdraw from Europe. But the Atlantic community was *their* community, too: all allies had to feel a stake in and responsibility for the achievement of common purposes.

As Prime Minister Heath has stated, four new members will now be joining with others in Europe „to work out the common European policies . . . governing our dealings with the rest of the world, our trade, our finance and eventually our defense.“ A Western European summit meeting may be held in the coming year, giving further impetus and direction to the emerging European identity. This will mark a striking change in political as well as economic relations across the Atlantic.

The United States is realistic. This change means the end of American tutelage and the end of the era of automatic unity. But discord is not inevitable either. The challenge to our maturity and political skill is to establish a new practice in Atlantic unity — finding common ground in a consensus of independent policies in stead of in deference to American prescriptions.

This essential harmony of our purposes is the enduring link between a uniting Europe and the United States. This is why we have always favored European unity and why we welcome its growth not only in geographical area but into new spheres of policy.

We continue to feel that political and defense cooperation within Europe will be the fulfillment of European unity. European and American interests in defense and East-West diplomacy are fundamentally parallel and give sufficient incentive for coordinating independent policies. Two strong powers in the West would add flexibility to Western diplomacy, and could increasingly share the responsibilities of decision.

Competitive habits within the Atlantic world are most natural in the economic